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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

EXODUS FROM THE LAND OF CONFUSION: WHY HUGHES V.
UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE OVERRULING OF THE
UNWORKABLE MARKS DOCTRINE AND A CHANGE IN COURT
PRACTICE
ABSTRACT
The Marks doctrine was established by the Supreme Court as an earnest
attempt to divine binding precedent from fractured decisions that failed to gain
support from a majority of the Justices. While well-intentioned, the doctrine has
proved to be, at best, difficult, and more often nearly impossible to correctly
apply with any degree of certainty. Recently, in Hughes v. United States, the
Court had the opportunity to further flesh out the doctrine and provide
struggling courts and practitioners guidance when working with the rule’s
abstruse mandates. Instead, the Court declined this opportunity. This comment
will discuss the development of the doctrine, the challenges that courts have had
when working with it, and the doctrine’s ultimate illogicality and unworkability.
The Court’s failure in Hughes to further develop the doctrine signifies the
beginning of the end. The Marks doctrine more properly belongs in a museum
than in contemporary American jurisprudence, and this comment will conclude
that the doctrine, along with non-majority opinions in general, should be
rendered obsolete and replaced by one, and only one, majority opinion that
provides the binding precedent for future courts to follow.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The second half of the twentieth century has seen a marked increase in the
number of concurring and dissenting opinions issued by the Supreme Court. 1
Because of this myriad of opinions, oftentimes no single opinion manages to
garner the support of at least five justices. 2 The question then arises of how to
determine binding precedent when a majority of the Court fails to subscribe to a
single opinion. In an attempt to solve this quandary and provide lower courts
guidance when weeding through a mess of concurring opinions that reach a
common result but with oftentimes wildly divergent reasoning, the Court in
Marks v. United States instructed that in these cases, the holding of the Court is
the position taken by the justices who concurred in the judgments on the
“narrowest grounds.” 3
Although the “narrowest grounds” doctrine was intended to dispel much of
the confusion surrounding non-majority opinions and their precedential value,
the doctrine has created more problems than it has solved. 4 Without directly
speaking to the doctrine’s continuing validity, the Court has been fickle in
deciding whether to even apply the doctrine in a case where it might be
appropriate. 5 The Court is fully aware of the headaches that it has caused with
its Marks opinion. Recently, in Hughes v. United States, the Court was presented
with an opportunity to apply the Marks doctrine to a prior case with a nearidentical fact pattern. 6 The Court instead bypassed the Marks question and
proceeded to resolve the case by applying the plurality opinion of the prior case. 7
Justice Sotomayor, whose lone concurrence was responsible for the lack of a
majority opinion in the prior case, acquiesced to the majority in Hughes in order

1. Linas E. Ledebur, Comment, Plurality Rule: Concurring Opinions and a Divided Supreme
Court, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 899, 900 (2009).
2. Id. at 904.
3. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)
(plurality opinion)).
4. Mark A. Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L. J. 419, 446 (1992) (explaining that the doctrine
produces inconsistent results, fails to reliably predict the outcome of future decisions, and often
leaves lower courts without guidance).
5. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1310 n.2 (1994)
(identifying and treating a “narrowest grounds” concurrence in a prior opinion as controlling);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (declining to apply Marks because the inquiry has
“baffled and divided” the lower courts); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994)
(similarly declining to apply Marks); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996)
(making no mention of Marks, but instead proceeding to overrule a prior case due to the degree of
confusion resulting from the splintered decision).
6. 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2018).
7. Id. at 1776.
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to ensure clarity and stability in the law despite continuing to hold her divergent
viewpoints on the issue. 8
This comment will argue that Hughes foretells a formal overruling of the
Marks doctrine by the Supreme Court. It will begin with a discussion of the
doctrine’s development. It will then explore the various methods and
interpretations used to apply the doctrine, identify their shortcomings, and
ultimately conclude that these shortcomings, when assessed in light of Hughes,
warrant a full overruling of Marks. It will then explore different possibilities for
ascertaining binding precedent in the doctrine’s absence before finally
concluding that plurality opinions should be altogether prohibited to streamline
the Court’s decisions and promote uniformity in the law. Due to the current
dissension within the Court, this comment will provide an answer to those
hoping for a return to a time when the Court was more unified in its voice.
II. HISTORY OF THE COURT’S APPROACHES TO SEPARATE OPINIONS AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE MARKS DOCTRINE
Although it is the province and duty of the Supreme Court to say what the
law is, 9 the Constitution provides very little guidance as to how the Court should
perform its interpretive function. 10 Consequently, at the Court’s inception, it
followed the English common law practice of issuing seriatim opinions. 11
Because no decision produced a single opinion of the Court, ambiguities in the
law abounded, which limited the early Court’s effectiveness and prevented the
Court from establishing itself as the head of a strong independent branch of
government. 12
That all changed in 1801 when John Marshall took his seat as Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. Under his leadership, the Court abandoned the seriatim
practice and would instead issue a single Opinion of the Court. 13 This policy
revolutionized the Court by fostering a new level of certainty and stability in the
law while simultaneously establishing the Court as a unified, independent, and
authoritative institution in the public mind. 14 However, even Chief Justice
Marshall was unable to maintain the Court’s unified voice as decisions began to

8. Id. at 1779 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
10. Ledebur, supra note 1, at 901–02; see U.S. CONST. art. III.
11. Although the Court would decide a case by a majority vote, each Justice would write a
separate opinion in support of his decision. See Adam S. Hochschild, Note, The Modern Problem
of Supreme Court Plurality Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL’Y 261, 263–65 (2000).
12. Ledebur, supra note 1, at 901–02.
13. Hochschild, supra note 11, at 267.
14. Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1421, 1443 (2006).
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be regularly published with multiple opinions towards the end of his term. 15 This
trend has only increased over the two centuries since Chief Justice Marshall’s
tenure on the Court, as the absence of his legendary leadership and the
increasingly intricate decisions issued by the Court have created greater
opportunities for disagreement. 16
Although historically seriatim decisions contained no precedential value
apart from the judgment as applied to the specific facts of the case, Chief Justice
Marshall’s legacy created an expectation in American jurisprudence that each
Supreme Court decision would produce binding precedent which could then be
used to decide future cases. 17 However, when the Court fails to issue a single
Opinion of the Court endorsed by a majority of the Justices, confusion and
inconsistency becomes rampant amongst courts and practitioners attempting to
apply these decisions. 18
The Court attempted to resolve this confusion when, in the 1977 case Marks
v. United States, Justice Powell authored a majority opinion declaring: “When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.” 19 At issue in Marks was the precedential force of the
fractured non-majority decision in the Supreme Court case, A Book Named
“John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General of
Massachusetts, 20 which announced three different perspectives on the standard
that expressive material should meet to sustain a conviction under federal
obscenity laws. 21 The plurality, consisting of Justices Brennan, Warren, and
Fortas, held that the material must satisfy the highly stringent standard of being

15. Hochschild, supra note 11, at 268.
16. Id. at 272–73.
17. Id. at 278–79.
18. Thurmon, supra note 4, at 427 & n.44.
19. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15 (plurality opinion)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
20. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
21. While the defendant in Marks was awaiting trial, the Court had issued a new decision
holding that a defendant could be convicted upon a finding, in part, that the material “lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In order
to not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
or the Article I Section 9 Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court, before it could apply the new standard
to the case at bar, would have to find that this new standard did nothing to significantly alter the
law as established under controlling precedent. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193. The most recent controlling
case with a majority opinion, Roth v. United States, held that a defendant may be convicted upon
finding that the objectionable material “appeals primarily to prurient interests.” Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). The Court concluded that the Miller standard did not significantly
depart from the holding in Roth. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193. However, the Court did find that Miller
“marked a significant departure from Memoirs” by expanding criminal liability. Id. at 194.
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“utterly without redeeming social value.” 22 Justice Stewart concurred but
asserted that only “hardcore pornography” should subject a defendant to
culpability, 23 while Justices Black and Douglas took the absolutist view that the
First Amendment altogether proscribes obscenity prosecutions. 24 The Court
announced that, despite its lack of a majority consensus, Memoirs was in fact
binding and that its holding was the position taken by the Members who
concurred on the “narrowest grounds.” 25 Without explaining its reasoning, the
Court identified the Memoirs plurality as the narrowest opinion and concluded
that the defendant could not be convicted unless the material was “utterly
without redeeming social value.” 26
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MARKS DOCTRINE
A.

Hughes v. United States

Over forty years after the Marks decision, the Court for the first time granted
certiorari to explain the “narrowest grounds” doctrine in the case Hughes v.
United States. 27 In that case, the defendant entered into a plea agreement
whereby he agreed to a 180-month sentence after being indicted for participating
in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.28 Although the sentencing judge
considered the sentencing guidelines prior to approving the agreement, the
agreement itself made no mention of the guidelines.29 However, shortly after the
defendant was sentenced, the Sentencing Commission reduced the applicable
sentencing range by about three to four years. 30 Consequently, the defendant
filed a motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which
authorizes a court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if that sentence was “based
on” sentencing guidelines that have subsequently been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission. 31
The controlling issue in the case was: when a defendant enters into a plea
agreement, is the resulting sentence “based on” the Sentencing Guidelines so
that the defendant may be eligible for a sentence reduction if those guidelines
22. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418.
23. Id. at 421 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499
(1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
24. Id. at 421, 433 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring) (citing Mishkin v. New York, 383
U.S. 502, 517-18 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting)).
25. Marks, 430 U.S. at 192–94.
26. Id. at 194–96.
27. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1772; see United States v. Negrón, 837 F.3d 91, 95 n.3 (1st Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2293 (2017); United States v. Robison 505 F.3d 1208, 1220–21 (11th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1045 (2008).
28. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1773–74.
29. Id. at 1774.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1774–75.
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are subsequently lowered? 32 To determine whether the defendant was eligible
for a reduction in his sentence, the Court looked to guidance from its decision in
Freeman v. United States, decided seven years earlier. 33 That case, which dealt
with the same issue as in Hughes, produced a fractured plurality decision that
created three possible interpretations of when a sentence imposed pursuant to a
plea agreement is “based on” the Sentencing Guidelines. 34 The plurality,
consisting of Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, concluded that as
long as the sentencing judge’s decision to accept the agreement involves the
judge consulting the Guidelines, then the sentence is based on the Sentencing
Guidelines. 35 In a dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito, argued that a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement
is based on the agreement and the agreement alone—not the Sentencing
Guidelines. 36 Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, concurred in the judgment
asserting that while the sentence imposed is inherently based on the agreement
itself, the imposed sentence may nonetheless be based on the Guidelines if either
the agreement itself calls for the defendant to be sentenced within a particular
Guidelines range, or the agreement prescribes a specific term of imprisonment,
but the agreement expressly indicates that the basis for that term is a Guidelines
sentencing range. 37
The Court in Hughes was therefore confronted with an opportunity to join
the legion of circuit courts who have already grappled with the endeavor of
applying Marks to the Freeman decision. 38 Three questions were presented to
the Court. The first two related to the proper application of Marks: (1) whether
a concurring opinion in a 4–1–4 decision represents the holding of the Court
where neither the plurality’s reasoning nor the concurrence’s reasoning is a
logical subset of the other; and (2) whether the lower courts are bound by the
four-Justice plurality opinion in Freeman, or, instead, by Justice Sotomayor’s
32. Id. at 1771, 1773.
33. 564 U.S. 522 (2011); see Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1771.
34. Id. at 525–26. Due to Freeman’s extensive treatment amongst the lower courts, the case
provided fertile ground for the Court’s decision to finally grant certiorari to a Marks question. See
Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1956 tbl.1 (2019) (identifying
Freeman as the decision most often interpreted in conjunction with an express citation to the Marks
rule within the federal circuit courts).
35. Freeman, 564 U.S. at 529–30, 534. Because a judge is statutorily required to consult the
Sentencing Guidelines prior to accepting a plea agreement, the plurality concluded that any
accepted plea agreement is likely to be “based on” the Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)
(2012).
36. Freeman, 564 U.S. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 538–39 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Because the agreement in Freeman stated that
the proposed 106-month sentence was determined pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, Justice
Sotomayor joined the plurality in holding that the defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction.
Id. at 542.
38. See Re, supra note 34, at 1956 tbl.1.
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concurrence with which all the other Justices disagreed. 39 The third question, on
the other hand, directly addressed the substantive issue of whether a defendant
who enters into a plea agreement is generally eligible for a sentence reduction if
there is a later amendment to the Guidelines. 40
The Court, however, declined to address the Marks issues and instead
proceeded to resolve the substantive issue without deferring to its decision in
Freeman. 41 The Court adhered to the plurality’s reasoning in Freeman and held
that because the sentencing judge is required to consult the Sentencing
Guidelines prior to accepting a plea agreement, the imposed sentence will
therefore usually be “based on” the Guidelines. 42 Interestingly, as in Freeman,
Justice Sotomayor again wrote a separate concurrence; however, this time she
explained that while she continued to believe that her Freeman concurrence
expressed the right approach, she recognized that Freeman had contributed to
confusion and discord amongst the lower courts and litigants, and she thereby
joined the majority in full in order to “ensure clarity and stability in the law and
promote[] uniformity in sentencing imposed by different federal courts for
similar criminal conduct.” 43
B.

Interpretations of Marks

The lack of clarity and stability in the law that followed the Freeman
decision can be attributed to competing interpretations amongst the circuits
regarding what exactly it means to apply the reasoning of the Justices who
concurred on the narrowest grounds. 44 The circuit split following Freeman
exemplified two of these interpretations. The first is the “fifth-vote” approach.
Under the fifth-vote rule, a decision will produce a binding Marks holding even
if there is no common ground in reasoning between the plurality and the
concurrences. 45 Instead, the fifth-vote rule looks to the results of the decision
and then identifies the narrowest position necessary to produce those results (or
the “fifth vote” that resulted in the majority judgment).46 The inquiry, therefore,
39. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2018). Unlike Freeman, the defendant
here would be ineligible for a sentence reduction under Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning because the
agreement in Hughes made no mention of the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at 1774.
40. Id. at 1772.
41. Id. One of the dissenters in Freeman, Justice Scalia, had since been replaced by Justice
Gorsuch who endorsed the Freeman plurality’s reasoning and thereby provided the fifth vote
necessary to produce the majority opinion in Hughes that was lacking in Freeman.
42. Id. at 1776. The Court further reasoned that this interpretation was most consistent with
the Sentencing Reform Act’s purpose of ensuring uniform sentencing treatment amongst
defendants. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(6), 3582(c)(2).
43. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1779 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
45. John P. Neuenkirchen, Plurality Decisions, Implicit Consensuses, and the Fifth-Vote Rule
Under Marks v. United States, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 387, 399 (2013).
46. Id. at 400.
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is: if satisfied, which position, taken by itself, would necessarily produce results
in future cases that a majority of Justices would agree with? 47 For example,
recall that in Freeman, four Justices voted in favor of eligibility for a sentence
reduction because the sentencing judge was required to consult the Sentencing
Guidelines prior to accepting the plea agreement and therefore, the sentence
imposed was based on the Guidelines. 48 Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand,
who provided the critical fifth vote, agreed that the defendant was eligible for a
sentence reduction, but only because his agreement expressly stated that the
proposed sentence was determined pursuant to the Guidelines. 49 Therefore, in
future cases, as long as Justice Sotomayor’s standard is satisfied, at least five of
the Freeman Justices (the plurality and Justice Sotomayor) would agree that the
defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction. The same cannot be said if only
the plurality’s reasoning is applied. Such was the case in Hughes, where the plea
agreement made no mention of the Guidelines.50 Under the Freeman plurality’s
standard, the defendant in Hughes would still be eligible for a reduction.51
However, Justice Sotomayor’s standard was not satisfied and therefore, under
the fifth-vote rule, she would not have voted in favor of a sentence reduction. 52
Consequently, had it used this approach, the Freeman Court would have held
the defendant in Hughes to be ineligible for a sentence reduction. 53
On the other side of the Freeman split were the Ninth and D.C. Circuits. 54
These courts followed the “logical subset” approach, which recognizes a Marks
holding only when one opinion represents a “common denominator” of the
Court’s reasoning. 55 In other words, the narrowest opinion is one that must be
implicitly approved by at least five Justices who support the judgment. 56 This
occurs when one position posits a narrow test to which the other must necessarily
agree as a logical consequence of its own, broader position. 57 The D.C. Circuit,

47. Id.
48. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 529–30, 534 (2011).
49. Id. at 542.
50. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2018).
51. See Freeman, 564 U.S. at 529–30, 534.
52. Id. at 538–39 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 687 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Even though eight
Justices disagreed with Justice Sotomayor’s approach . . . her reasoning provided the narrowest,
most case-specific basis for deciding Freeman.”).
54. United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Epps,
707 F.3d 337, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
55. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991); but see Re, supra note 34, at 1981
(acknowledging that proponents of the logical subset approach nonetheless generally focus on
outcomes rather than legal principles that are implicitly endorsed by a majority of Justices).
56. King, 950 F.2d at 781.
57. Epps, 707 F.3d at 348.
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in King v. Palmer, 58 explained the logical subset approach by returning to the
Memoirs case. The court identified Justices Black and Douglas’s absolutist
position as the broadest approach. 59 It then recognized Justice Stewart’s view
that only “hardcore pornography” may qualify as obscenity as the next narrowest
approach, followed by the plurality’s view that the material must be “utterly
without redeeming social value” to be considered obscene. 60 The logic is as
follows: all material that has redeeming social value must not be hardcore
pornography, and material that is not hardcore pornography must also be
protected under Justices Black and Douglas’s absolutist First Amendment
view. 61 Thus, while only three Justices would agree that anything that is not
hardcore pornography is protected under the First Amendment, all five Justices
would agree that anything with redeeming social value is protected, and this
viewpoint therefore has implicit majority support. 62
It is not surprising if the reader is now left scratching her head. The logical
subset approach is ironically fraught with illogicalities and has been heavily
criticized by commentators. 63 Put simply, the fact that a decision produces a
separate concurrence indicates that some Justices do not accept the narrower
rule, which conflicts with the majoritarian principles underlying the Marks
doctrine. 64 One of the rule’s errors lies in the “fallacy of division,” or the
principle that the characteristics of the whole do not necessarily share the
characteristics of its component parts. 65 A slight tweaking of the Memoirs
plurality’s rule can produce a knee-jerk response sufficient to illustrate this
point. Imagine that Justices Black and Douglas continued to hold their views
that obscenity prosecutions are categorically unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. 66 Now, however, imagine that instead of prohibiting an obscenity

58. 950 F.2d at 781. Freeman would not provide an apt example of the “logical subset”
approach because the 9th and D.C. Circuits held that Marks was inapplicable because no opinion
in Freeman was a logical subset of another. Davis, 825 F.3d at 1021–22; Epps, 707 F.3d at 350.
59. King, 950 F.2d at 781.
60. Id. (quoting Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418–19 (1966)).
61. See id. at 781 & n.6.
62. See id.
63. See Re, supra note 34, at 1981–84 (2019); Thurmon, supra note 4, at 432; Adam Steinman,
Nonmajority Opinions and Biconditional Rules, 128 YALE L.J. F. 1, 11–14 (2018) (discussing the
fallibility of the logical subset approach specifically in relation to biconditional (“if-and-only-if”)
rules); Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 1593, 1604 (1992).
64. Kimura, supra note 63, at 1604.
65. Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument That the Greater Includes the
Lesser, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 243 (1994). It is useful to consider the analogy that while table
salt is a harmless substance, it is not true that its component elements, sodium and chlorine, are
harmless by themselves. Id.
66. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 421, 433 (1966) (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
concurring).
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conviction unless the material is “utterly without redeeming social value,” 67 the
plurality instead held that an obscenity conviction is prohibited unless the
material depicts interracial couples. The logical subset approach assumes that
Justices Black and Douglas would necessarily agree with this rule as a logical
consequence of their own broader approach to First Amendment rights (the
plurality rule would protect much of the same material as the absolutist rule
would). 68 However, it can hardly be argued that such ardent proponents of
Constitutional rights would implicitly support a blatantly discriminatory rule
even if it upholds First Amendment rights in many—perhaps even most—
cases. 69 In fact, it is likely that they would sooner support a categorical bar on
all sexually explicit material before they would support a rule that discriminates
based on race. 70 True, the Memoirs plurality’s test did not involve such an
appallingly blatant violation of Constitutional rights, but the principle that this
hypothetical illustrates is the same: support for the broad position does not
necessarily entail support for another position that places a limiting condition on
the applicability of the broader position’s rule. 71
The “logical subset” rule also fails when it is applied to decisions containing
biconditional rules (“if-and-only-if” rules). 72 For example, assume that, contrary
to the Ninth and D.C. Circuits’ determinations, 73 Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence in Freeman was in fact a logical subset of the plurality opinion. 74
Both the plurality’s rule and Justice Sotomayor’s rule could both be understood
as biconditional rules. 75 According to Justice Sotomayor, if the plea agreement
expressly refers to the Sentencing Guidelines, then the defendant would be
eligible for a sentence reduction. 76 If the agreement does not expressly refer to
the Guidelines, then the defendant would not be eligible. 77 The plurality, on the
other hand, would grant eligibility if either the agreement itself expressly
referred to the Sentencing Guidelines or the Sentencing Guidelines were

67. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418.
68. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
69. See Re, supra note 34, at 1983. Justices Black and Douglas both joined the unanimous
decision in Loving v. Virginia, issued the year after the Memoirs decision, which declared a state
statue prohibiting miscegenation unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
70. See Re, supra note 34, at 1983.
71. See id.
72. Steinman, supra note 63, at 12–14.
73. United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Epps,
707 F.3d 337, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
74. See Steinman, supra note 63, at 11–12, 14; see also United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 665
F.3d 344, 348 (1st Cir. 2011).
75. Steinman, supra note 63, at 11.
76. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 538–39 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
77. Id.
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otherwise relevant to the sentencing judge in accepting the agreement. 78 If the
agreement neither expressly referred to the Guidelines nor were the Guidelines
otherwise relevant to the judge accepting the agreement, then the defendant
would not be eligible. 79 In every case in which Justice Sotomayor would grant
eligibility, the plurality would necessarily grant eligibility as well. 80 However,
the same cannot be said for the inverse. There could be cases, like the one
presented in Hughes, 81 where Justice Sotomayor’s rule would deny eligibility
while the plurality’s rule would not. 82 Instead, in cases denying eligibility, the
plurality’s rule now becomes the logical subset of Justice Sotomayor’s rule!83
Thus, when opinions rely on rules containing biconditional logic, no single
opinion can be the logical subset of another. 84
Although the fifth-vote rule has been less heavily criticized than the logical
subset approach, 85 it too is problematic. The main criticism is that under this
rule, the views of a single Justice can become binding even though all eight other
Justices might disagree. 86 Additionally, views of dissenting Justices could seep
into a concurring Justice’s opinion, giving precedential weight to a dissenting
viewpoint. 87 There is also a more subtle analytical problem with this rule. The
idea behind the fifth-vote rule is that the Justice providing the fifth vote
necessary for the judgment encapsulates the reasoning that would produce the
same results in the future. 88 However, the predictive ability of the fifth-vote rule
is significantly lessened when the reasoning is applied to cases that bear only
some resemblance to the case that produced the opinion. 89 Take, for example,
Baldasar v. Illinois, where the Court considered whether a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction could be used to convert a subsequent misdemeanor
78. Id. at 530 (2011) (“[M]odification proceedings should be available to permit the district
court to revisit a prior sentence to whatever extent the sentencing range in question was a relevant
part of the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the
agreement.”) (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. Steinman, supra note 63, at 14.
81. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2018).
82. Steinman, supra note 63, at 14.
83. If the plurality would deny eligibility, then Justice Sotomayor would necessarily deny
eligibility as well. Id.
84. Id. at 12.
85. See, e.g., Neuenkirchen, supra note 45, at 388; Thurmon, supra note 4, at 435; Re, supra
note 34, at 1984.
86. Neuenkirchen, supra note 45, at 407.
87. Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint,
69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 815 (2017). For example, in Freeman, Justice Sotomayor agreed with the
dissent that the sentence is based on the plea agreement itself and not the judge’s calculation of the
Sentencing Guidelines, as the plurality asserted. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 534
(2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
88. Thurmon, supra note 4, at 436.
89. Id.
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into a felony with an increased prison term under an enhanced penalty statute.90
In a short per curiam opinion, the Court held that it may not. 91 However, the
decision yielded three different concurrences, each providing a different
rationale for the result. Justice Stewart reasoned that because the defendant was
only being sentenced to an increased prison term because of the prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, his Sixth Amendment rights were thereby
violated. 92 Justice Marshall, on the other hand, argued that without the assistance
of counsel, the prior conviction was “not sufficiently reliable to support the
severe sanction of imprisonment.” 93 Finally, Justice Blackmun reiterated his
views from his dissent in Scott v. Illinois, and maintained that the prior
conviction was invalid for all purposes because the Sixth Amendment requires
a defendant to be provided with counsel whenever the defendant is prosecuted
for an offense punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment or whenever
the defendant is actually sentenced to imprisonment. 94
Later, in Nichols v. United States, the Court was required to apply the
Baldasar decision to determine whether a defendant who had already been
convicted of a felony and subjected to imprisonment could receive an increased
sentence because of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction. 95 Although
there had been considerable confusion within the lower courts as to which
concurrence in Baldasar represented the narrowest grounds for the decision, 96
the Court recognized that Justice Blackmun’s opinion represented the “fifth
vote.” 97 The defendant in Nichols had previously been convicted of driving
under the influence (DUI), which was a misdemeanor punishable by up to one
year’s imprisonment. 98 Under Justice Blackmun’s reasoning, this prior
uncounseled conviction was invalid because it was punishable by more than six
months’ imprisonment and therefore, it could not be used in the present case to
increase the defendant’s term of imprisonment. 99 However, unlike Baldasar,
90. 446 U.S. 222, 223 (1980). In a prior case, Scott v. Illinois, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment only requires that a defendant be afforded the right to counsel if the defendant is
actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment, regardless of whether the offense might be
punishable by imprisonment. 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979).
91. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224.
92. Id. (Stewart, J. concurring).
93. Id. at 227 (Marshall, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
95. 511 U.S. 738, 740–41 (1994).
96. Id. at 745.
97. Id. at 744; see also Santillanes v. United States Parole Commission, 754 F.2d 887, 889
(10th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Baldasar to rest on the narrowest
grounds because, unlike Justices Stewart and Marshall, Justice Blackmun asserted that so long as
a prior conviction is Constitutionally valid then it may be used for a sentence enhancement in a
future case).
98. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 740 & n.1.
99. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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where the defendant would not be facing a felony conviction carrying a term of
imprisonment but for the prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, 100 the
defendant in Nichols had already been convicted of a felony and was already
facing imprisonment. 101 Acknowledging this distinction, which led both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals to deny the defendant’s objection to the
inclusion of the DUI misdemeanor conviction in calculating his prison sentence,
the Court proceeded to overrule Baldasar and held that the prior DUI conviction
could be used to increase the sentence because the defendant was not actually
imprisoned for the DUI. 102 Even though Justice Blackmun remained steadfast in
the beliefs articulated in his Baldasar concurrence, 103 the Court took a different
path largely because of the factual dissimilarity in Nichols. Thus, despite the
“fifth-vote” rule’s purpose of applying the reasoning which can accurately
predict how the Court will rule in future cases, 104 the factual divergence in
Nichols undermined the rule’s underlying logic by leading the Court to a
conclusion in direct conflict with the conclusion necessitated by Justice
Blackmun’s Baldasar concurrence.
C. The Court’s History of Criticizing and Undermining Marks
The Court has long been aware of the problems created by its Marks
decision. While it has been happy to apply the doctrine to cases where it found
a clear narrower holding, 105 the Court has not been shy about voicing its
criticism of the doctrine in those more difficult cases. Prior to overruling
Baldasar, the Court in Nichols acknowledged that Marks was applicable to
properly interpreting Baldasar. 106 However, noting the confusion that the
fractured Baldasar decision had caused within the lower courts, the Court
acknowledged that the Marks test is often “more easily stated than applied.” 107
In light of this confusion, the Court declared that it was “not useful to pursue the
Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled
100. Id. at 223.
101. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 740–41.
102. Id. at 748–49 (maintaining that this holding was the “logical consequence” of the Scott
decision).
103. See id. at 756 & n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Neuenkirchen, supra note 45, at 400.
105. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007) (identifying Justice Powell’s
concurrence in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411–12 (1986), as the “more limited holding”
without explaining its reasoning or suggesting any difficulty in making this determination); O’Dell
v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 162 (1997) (expressing similar ease in determining that Justice
White’s concurring opinion in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 363–64 (1977) was the narrowest
holding); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 n.9 (1988) (refuting the
dissent’s position that the plurality opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85–86 (1949) was
not controlling because the Kovacs plurality “clearly” put forth the narrowest rationale).
106. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745.
107. Id.
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and divided the lower courts that have considered it,” and it proceeded to
reexamine and overrule Baldasar. 108
The Court again declined to apply Marks in Grutter v. Bollinger, a case that
presented the question of whether a public university could justify considering
race as one of many factors in selecting applicants for admission on the grounds
of ensuring diversity within the institution. 109 In a landmark case on affirmative
action, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Court held that,
while a public university could not be altogether prohibited from considering
race in its admissions program, the program could not be designed to assure
admission to a specified number of students from certain minority groups. 110
Again, that decision generated three different opinions, none of which were
endorsed by a majority of the Court. Four Justices held the program invalid
because they found that it violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 111
while four other Justices would have upheld the program because the
discrimination was not to demean or insult, but rather to remedy past racial
prejudice. 112 Justice Powell, who provided the fifth vote, asserted that while an
admissions program may not focus solely on ethnic diversity, race may be
considered as a single element amongst a broader array of qualifications and
characteristics in order to ensure a kind of diversity that furthers a compelling
state interest. 113
Although Justice Powell’s opinion had come to serve as the “touchstone for
constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies,” 114 lower courts
were nonetheless divided over whether his opinion was in fact binding. 115 In
light of this disagreement, the Court in Grutter again took the liberty to bypass
the Marks question because it had “so obviously baffled and divided the lower
courts.” 116 The Court adhered to Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke and found a
compelling state interest in promoting institutional diversity while holding that
the university may further that interest by considering an applicant’s race in

108. Id. at 745–46.
109. 539 U.S. 306, 319, 322 (2003).
110. 438 U.S. 265, 269–72 (1978).
111. Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
112. Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
113. Id. at 315.
114. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319, 322.
115. Compare Johnson v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 563 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir.
2001) (Justice Powell’s opinion was not binding); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274–275 (5th
Cir. 2000) (same); with Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding Justice Powell’s opinion to be the “narrowest footing” upon which a race-conscious
decision making process could stand).
116. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319, 325 (quoting Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46
(1994)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

EXODUS FROM THE LAND OF CONFUSION

241

order to promote the robust exchange of ideas and to prepare students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society. 117
Then came Hughes. Although, unlike in Nichols and Grutter, the Court
never explicitly expressed a difficulty in applying Marks to the case, 118 the Court
could not hide its disapproval for the doctrine. By refusing to address the Marks
question in what may have arguably been the most apropos case to come before
it, 119 the Court has effectively voiced its aversion to the doctrine. 120 However, it
was Justice Sotomayor who verbalized in her concurrence what the rest of the
Court was undoubtedly thinking: Marks has done little to promote “consistency,
predictability, and evenhandedness” in the criminal justice system, but instead
has “contributed to ongoing discord among the lower courts, sown confusion
among litigants, and left the governing rule uncertain.” 121
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF HUGHES
A.

The Future of Marks

The question now remains as to the future of the doctrine post-Hughes.
While optimists may understand Hughes as the beginning of the end for Marks,
it is of course possible that Marks is here to stay. However, in light of the Court
admitting to the confusion that Marks has caused, coupled with its inconsistency
in applying the doctrine, lower courts will be left wondering what their own
obligations are to follow the doctrine. Looking back to Nichols, courts can find
helpful guidance. By taking that Court’s refusal to find the narrowest ground as
precedent, a lower court deciding a Marks issue can ask if a fractured opinion
has obviously baffled and divided lower courts, and if so, then that court may
choose to disregard Marks and apply whichever position that it finds most
compelling. 122 Rather than requiring lower courts to find a Marks holding in
every single plurality decision that they are faced with, this rule would in fact be
more in line with their duty to follow Supreme Court precedent. Under Marks,
when the Court issues a plurality opinion, it theoretically creates binding
precedent which is found in the opinion that concurred on the narrowest

117. Id. at 329–30.
118. See Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2018).
119. See Re, supra note 34, at 1956 tbl.1 (identifying Freeman as the decision most often
interpreted in conjunction with an express citation to the Marks rule within the federal circuit
courts).
120. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 84-87
(1960) (a court may avoid adhering to a precedent without expressly overruling it by choosing to
not apply the precedent to the problem at hand).
121. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1779 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 354 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
122. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994).
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grounds. 123 However, by choosing not to follow the doctrine in difficult
circumstances, the Court effectively overrules this precedent that lower courts
had been obliged to follow. 124 At the same time, the Supreme Court is quick to
abandon the Marks doctrine without affording it the degree of deference that it
usually gives to its own precedents. 125 By following the Court’s lead in Nichols
and Grutter, lower courts can mimic the Supreme Court’s approach to Marks:
follow the rule when it’s easy to do so, throw it out when the going gets tough. 126
Support for this approach can be found in the Marks decision itself. A close
examination of the wording used to articulate the Marks rule reveals that the
holding of the Court may—not shall—be viewed as the narrowest grounds
position. 127 Furthermore, upon adopting this rule and finding the Memoirs
plurality as constituting the narrowest grounds in that decision, the Court in
Marks acknowledged that every lower court to consider the issue had come to
the same conclusion. 128 Therefore, it is quite possible that the Marks doctrine
was never intended to apply to the baffling and divisive situations encountered
in Nichols and Grutter. 129
The Court has suggested that it would condone lower courts following this
approach. In Rapanos v. United States, the Court was asked to decide whether
certain wetlands were “waters of the United States” for the purpose of
establishing federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.130 The plurality
opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, concluded that only wetlands with a
“continuous surface connection” to a relatively permanent body of water
connected to traditional interstate navigable waters were subject to federal
jurisdiction. 131 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, asserted in his concurrence
that the proper test should instead be whether the wetlands possess a “significant
nexus” to navigable waterways. 132 The decision was an anomaly in terms of
Marks. Neither test was inherently narrower than the other and although Justice
Scalia’s was stricter in that it required a physical connection to a navigable
waterway, certain situations could exist where Justice Scalia’s test would find
federal jurisdiction while Justice Kennedy’s would not. 133 In a separate

123. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
124. Thurmon, supra note 4, at 441–42.
125. Id. at 442.
126. See id.
127. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
128. Id. at 194.
129. See Re, supra note 34, at 1996.
130. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006).
131. Id. at 742.
132. Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. Joseph M. Cacace, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A
Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97,
123 (2007). This could occur when, for example, a wetland shares a slight surface connection with
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concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts lamented the Court’s failure to deliver a
majority opinion and, citing the Court’s decision in Grutter to disregard the
Marks rule, observed that lower courts interpreting the holding would have to
“feel their way on a case-by-case basis.” 134 Dissenting, Justice Stevens directed
lower courts to forgo the Marks analysis and find jurisdiction if either the
plurality’s rule or Justice Kennedy’s rule is satisfied. 135 Therefore, the
impossibility of properly applying the Marks doctrine to the Rapanos decision,
combined with Justices Roberts and Stevens’ direction to lower courts to
interpret the fractured decision without regard to Marks, indicates that the Court
would approve of lower courts disregarding the doctrine in difficult cases.
Furthermore, Hughes itself suggests that the Court would approve of lower
courts discarding the Marks doctrine in exceptionally confusing circumstances.
In choosing not to apply Marks, the Court in Hughes abrogated the decisions of
eight different circuit courts in their earnest attempts to apply the doctrine to the
Freeman problem. 136 Instead of taking guidance from the wisdom of eight
circuits as to the proper application of Marks and following Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence, the Court instead placed its stamp of approval on the conclusion
reached by a small minority of circuits who cast Marks aside and applied the
plurality opinion, finding it most persuasive. 137 In light of Justice Sotomayor’s
comment that her Freeman concurrence had “contributed to ongoing discord
among the lower courts” and “sown confusion among litigants,” 138 the Court’s
refusal to follow what appeared to be binding precedent under Marks may
therefore be construed as an invitation for the lower courts to do the same when
faced with a similarly confusing decision. 139
a navigable waterway, but that connection is so insubstantial that there is no significant nexus to
the waterway. Id.
134. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 325 (2003)).
135. Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although the four dissenting Justices recognized much
broader authority in the Executive to regulate the Nation’s waters, all four of those Justices would
find federal jurisdiction in all cases in which either the plurality or Justice Kennedy finds
jurisdiction. Id. In the absence of the Marks analysis, and without any binding authority compelling
Justice Stevens’s approach to the issue, finding federal jurisdiction if either test is satisfied would
likely be the most compelling interpretation of the Rapanos decision for the reasons articulated by
Justice Stevens. See id.
136. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771, 1774–75 (2018) (abrogating United States
v. Benitez, 822 F.3d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Graham, 704 F.3d 1275, 1277–78
(10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Thompson, 682 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v.
Browne, 698 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Dixon, 687 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir.
2012); United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d 337, 340 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Smith, 658
F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 665 F.3d 344, 348 (1st Cir. 2011)).
137. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1771, 1774–75 (citing United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021–
22 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Epps, 707 F.3d 337, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
138. Hughes, 138 S Ct. at 1779 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
139. See Thurmon, supra note 4, at 441–42.
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Despite Court precedent suggesting that Marks should not be followed in
cases where the doctrine has “so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts
that have considered it,” 140 it must be remembered that Marks has not yet been
overruled and is therefore still good law. Some might argue that now, after
Hughes, Marks has been so seriously undermined that it does not represent
present doctrine. 141 Under the once-tenable doctrine of “implicit overrule,” a
lower court might conclude that Marks is dead and accordingly choose to not
follow the doctrine, thereby saving the Supreme Court the hassle of having to
address a Marks issue in the future. 142 After eagerly throwing out the Marks
issues in Hughes, the Court might welcome the prospect of never having to
wrestle with the doctrine again. Although there was a time in history where a
lower court might feel free to save the Court the hassle of having to formally
overrule its own outdated and eroded precedents, the Court has since—some
would argue foolishly— 143 foreclosed this option. 144
The Court owes it to both the lower courts and to itself to finally put an end
to the confusion created by Marks. If it is true that now, after having again been
criticized and ultimately disregarded in Hughes, the doctrine no longer
represents the present state of the law, the Court must say so. 145 This was the
burden that the Court took on in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., when it forbade lower courts from coming to a conclusion about
the viability of precedent themselves. 146 That case considered whether
arbitration agreements were valid under the Securities Act of 1933. 147 While the
1953 case Wilko v. Swan held that such agreements were not valid under the
1933 Act, 148 a later case, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
rejected the rationale in Wilko and held that arbitration agreements were in fact
valid under the 1934 Act, despite the 1934 Act and the 1933 Act containing

140. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994).
141. See David C. Bratz, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise of Supreme
Court Precedent, 60 WASH. L. REV. 87, 92 (1984).
142. See id. at 93.
143. C. Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court’s Ill-Advised
Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 42 (1990).
144. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (chastising
lower courts for concluding that the Supreme Court had undermined its own precedent to the extent
that they were not obliged to follow the precedent even though the Court, in the following sentences
of the Opinion, proceeded to overrule the precedent itself).
145. Albert P. Blaustein & Andrew H. Field, “Overruling” Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57
MICH. L. REV. 151, 173 (1958) (recognizing that it is necessary for the Court to expressly overrule
a prior decision when that decision has already been implicitly overruled, but the Court has
neglected to say so).
146. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484.
147. Id. at 478.
148. 346 U.S. 427, 434–35 (1953).
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virtually identical provisions governing the waiver of judicial trial and review. 149
Although logic would dictate that McMahon had overruled Wilko, lower courts
were nonetheless bound to follow this inviable precedent, making its formal
overruling in Rodriguez necessary.
Similarly, a lower court might conclude that the Court’s refusal in Hughes
to apply the Marks doctrine is strong evidence that the doctrine no longer reflects
the current state of the law. Until the Court expressly overrules Marks, though,
lower courts will have to continue to weed through a mess of concurring
opinions trying to identify the narrowest rationale, all while knowing that under
Hughes the correct result in the eyes of the Court might be the one reached not
by finding the narrowest grounds, but instead by disregarding Marks entirely. 150
A formal overruling is therefore necessary.
In addition to making explicit what is already implicit, it is necessary for the
Court to overrule a prior decision when that decision is impracticable and has
resulted in “great hardship or inconvenience.” 151 Continuing to follow a decision
that has resulted in such hardship directly contravenes the policies that the Court
has identified as underlying stare decisis: clear guidance provided by the law to
govern conduct, fair and expeditious adjudication, and public faith in the
judiciary as a source of reasoned judgment. 152 The Court in the past has not
hesitated to overrule a prior decision when a failure to do so would do violence
to these policies. At the risk of causing nightmares amongst any first-year Civil
Procedure students reading this article, a brief examination of the famous
overruling decision, Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 153 can illustrate this
point. That case, of course, overruled the nearly century-old precedent
established in Swift v. Tyson that directed federal courts sitting in diversity to not
apply the common law as established by the state’s highest court, but to instead
apply general and widely-accepted legal reasoning and principles to determine
the outcome of a case. 154 In overruling Swift, Justice Brandeis noted the
“injustice and confusion” caused by the impossibility of drawing a clear line
between “general law” and local law, the inherent unfairness in allowing a
plaintiff to seek more favorable laws merely by filing a diversity action in federal
court, and the violation of federalist principles that occurs when the federal
judiciary infringes upon a state’s exclusive lawmaking authority. 155
Likewise, continuing to follow Marks would offend stare decisis principles,
which necessitates its overruling. As aptly acknowledged by Justice Sotomayor
in Hughes, Marks has done anything but provide clear guidance in determining
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

482 U.S. 220, 238, 256 (1987).
See Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771, 1775 (2018).
Blaustein & Field, supra note 145, at 170.
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938).
41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842).
Erie, 304 U.S. at 74–79.
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eligibility for a sentence reduction. 156 To the contrary, the doctrine has “left the
governing rule uncertain,” led to the unequal treatment of criminal defendants
based on the circuit in which the case arose, and has undermined the “integrity
and legitimacy” of the American justice system. 157 Thus, if the past is any
indication of the Court’s willingness to overrule faulty doctrine when necessary,
then it is only a matter of time before the Court will announce the ultimate
demise of Marks.
B.

In the Absence of Marks

If Marks’s days truly are numbered, then how should courts interpret
plurality decisions in its absence, and more fundamentally, must troublesome
non-majority decisions continue to afflict Supreme Court jurisprudence at all?
Historically, the precedential value of a plurality opinion had been limited
to the specific result of the decision. 158 Non-majority opinions would therefore
be merely persuasive and the decision would be binding on future cases only to
the extent that the future case had a nearly identical fact pattern to the prior
case. 159 While this was not a problem throughout the nineteenth and the first half
of the twentieth centuries, plurality decisions are far more common today. 160
Although this method would certainly remedy much of the confusion created by
Marks and free lower courts to come to their own legal conclusions when
considering the various non-majority opinions for their persuasive value,
returning to this method would result in a large percentage of Court decisions
that offer very little guidance in future cases, thereby contributing to the same
disparate and unfair treatment that Marks has been criticized for causing. 161
Admittedly, there is no perfect solution. However, a rule making the
plurality opinion precedent provides a compelling alternative to the traditional
approach of according no precedential weight to plurality decisions. Like the
traditional approach, the value of this rule lies in its simplicity. 162 On the other
hand, like Marks, this rule is vulnerable to attack in that it violates democratic
principles by allowing less than a majority of the Court to set binding
precedent. 163 It also encounters problems when there is an even split among the
concurring Justices. 164 Nevertheless, its saving feature is that, unlike the Marks
rule which could allow the views of a single justice to become binding

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1779 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id.
Thurmon, supra note 4, at 420.
Ledebur, supra note 1, at 911.
Cacace, supra note 133, at 104; Hochschild, supra note 11, at 272.
See Cacace, supra note 133, at 104.
Ledebur, supra note 1, at 912.
Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 64, 86.
Ledebur, supra note 1, at 912.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

EXODUS FROM THE LAND OF CONFUSION

247

precedent, 165 this rule would create binding precedent from a position adopted
by the “majority of the majority.” 166
Other more creative solutions have been proposed as well. One approach,
known as the “hybrid approach,” incorporates elements of the two previously
mentioned alternatives with the Marks doctrine itself. 167 Under this approach, a
court interpreting a fragmented decision would first identify the rationes
decidendi, or the reasoning necessary to reach the conclusions (as opposed to
dicta), in the various plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions. 168 Once the
rationes decidendi have been identified, a court would then determine which
ones share the support of at least five justices. 169 The ones that have majority
support would then be binding authority while the ones that do not would merely
be persuasive and their persuasiveness would be correlated to the number of
justices that supported the particular ratio decidendi. 170 While this approach
would both cure the Marks defect of giving precedential weight to non-majority
positions and further the Marks goal of establishing binding rules of law in
fractured decisions, this approach threatens to be more complex and challenging
to apply than Marks itself, especially because it is often difficult to identify the
exact ratio decidendi in an opinion. 171
Another inventive solution is known as the “legitimacy model.” This model
would place each opinion in a fractured decision into one of five different
categories. 172 Whether the opinion is binding depends on its category, and the
categories are delineated by considering the extent to which they promote the
principles of precedential legitimacy: a judgment supported by a majority, the
need for a reasoned outcome, and a nexus between the two. 173 While a detailed
description of the legitimacy model, its categories, and the purpose behind the
model is far beyond the scope of this analysis, suffice it to say that the legitimacy
model is extraordinarily complex and, if none of a fractured decision’s opinions
fall into a category that is accorded precedential weight by the model, the
decision would yield no binding precedent whatsoever. 174
There is a better option. Nothing prohibits the Court from changing its rules
to eliminate plurality decisions. 175 A majority vote is all that would be needed

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Neuenkirchen, supra note 45, at 407.
Kimura, supra note 63, at 1601.
Thurmon, supra note 4, at 450–51.
Id. at 426, 451.
Id.
Id.
Ledebur, supra note 1, at 913.
Kimura, supra note 63, at 1604.
See id.
Id. at 1611.
See Ledebur, supra note 1, at 915.
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to effect such a change. 176 Prior to the recent death of Justice Ginsburg, at least
five of the Justices on the Court had either expressed outright dissatisfaction
with non-majority opinions or have endorsed opinions criticizing Marks. 177
Although Justice Barrett has not yet weighed in on Marks, a majority vote to
change the rule nonetheless looks promising.
This raises the question: how might five Justices all agree on a single
majority opinion? It may not be as difficult as one might expect. Marks in fact
promotes dissension by incentivizing the Justices to write the “narrowest”
opinion so that their own personal views might become binding precedent. 178
Eliminating the Marks doctrine would therefore promote cohesion. Furthermore,
despite the flurry of concurrences and dissents coming out of the Court these
days, the Justices have shown a willingness to acquiesce to the majority when
necessary to provide better guidance to lower courts. 179 The Justices have even
demonstrated an ability to reconcile their differing views to come to a single
majority opinion that is acceptable to all. In Arizona v. Gant, the Court held that
police may search a vehicle incident to an arrest only when the arrestee is
unsecured and has access to the passenger compartment at the time of the
search. 180 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, would have held that a vehicle search
incident to arrest is reasonable only when the object of the search is to discover
evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made or evidence of another crime
that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred. 181 In order to gain Justice
Scalia’s deciding vote, the Court followed Justice Scalia’s suggestion and
further held that a search incident to arrest may also be lawful when his evidence
of a crime criteria is met. 182 This case thus demonstrates the Court’s willingness
to adopt a rule that neither the majority nor the concurrence fully embraced, but
was nonetheless acceptable to all.
176. Id.
177. See Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1779 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(Justice Sotomayor seeking to eliminate confusion by abandoning her own views and endorsing the
majority opinion); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(Chief Justice Roberts disappointed by the Court’s failure to issue a single majority opinion in the
case); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (Justices Ginsburg and Breyer endorsing an
opinion criticizing Marks for “baffl[ing] and divid[ing] the lower courts”); Nichols v. United States,
511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994) (Justice Thomas joining the opinion with the same criticism of
Marks).
178. Berkolow, Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony of
Concurrences, and Re-Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 352 (2008).
179. See, e.g., Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1779 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 353 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) (Justice Thomas “reluctantly” joins
the majority to provide lower courts guidance); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 408
(2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (Justice O’Connor joins the majority for the same reasons).
180. 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009).
181. Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 335, 354.
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It might be argued that a rule requiring each judicial decision to result in a
single binding majority opinion would require the Justices in some cases to
support decisions that they do not believe are legally sound, thereby violating
their judicial duty. 183 However, Justices have been engaging in this practice for
close to a century without eliciting opposition. 184 While unwavering adherence
to judicial correctness is certainly an admirable principle for a Justice to follow,
as Justice Sotomayor observed in Hughes, it is often necessary for a Justice to
accede to a less-than-desirable viewpoint in order to “ensure clarity and stability
in the law” when a failure to compromise would “sow[] confusion among
litigants, and le[ave] the governing rule uncertain.” 185
Nothing in this proposed rule change should be read to suggest that any
Justice’s voice should be altogether silenced. Although some might yearn for the
Court to return to the days of Chief Justice Marshall, when a decision resulted
in one, and only one, Opinion of the Court, 186 that seems unlikely considering
the current level of dissension within the Court. 187 Instead, a Justice should still
be allowed to write a concurring or dissenting opinion, but these opinions would
be limited to merely persuasive authority. Hardly without value, these opinions
would allow a Justice to write to future generations so that the Court may one
day recognize the errors of the past. 188 Their ability to bind other courts,
however, will not be realized until it is proper to do so: when at least five Justices
are willing to unequivocally stand up, sign their name to the opinion, and declare
to the American legal community that the law has changed.
V. CONCLUSION
While it began as a reasonable attempt to clarify the confusion surrounding
non-majority decisions, Marks has run its course. Its myriad problems have
afflicted American jurisprudence for half of a century. The Court is well aware
of these problems and, if the Court’s willingness to correct itself in the past is
any indication, then it will only be a matter of time before the Court announces
what courts, lawyers, and scholars have understood for years: Marks was wrong.
Ascertaining legal precedent from a Court opinion is a difficult and complex
183. Re, supra note 34, at 1999.
184. Id. at 1998; see supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 353–54 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (Black, J., concurring); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945)
(Rutledge, J., concurring).
185. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1779 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Hochschild, supra note 11, at 267.
187. See Sean McCauley, Revising the Marks Rule in Light of a Plurality Prone Supreme Court:
A Case Study of National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 26 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
257, 266 (2017).
188. Id. at 263.
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task as it is; there is no need to further convolute it by casting doubt upon
whether a given opinion is even precedential at all. A radical change is in order.
The good news is that this change can be a remarkably uncomplicated endeavor
if the Court allows it to be. By throwing out Marks and the plurality decisions
that engendered the doctrine, the Court can reestablish itself as a truly singular
institution, unified in its voice and banded together in its ultimate pursuit of
justice.
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